Can Technology Keep Us Safe? New Security Systems, Technological- Organizational Convergence, Developing Urban Security Regimes Holger Floeting February 2007 2 Contents 1. Changing Conditions – Time for New Approaches? ........................................................... 2 1.1 New threats? .................................................................................................................... 2 1.2 New approaches to improved safety? ................................................................................ 3 2. Security as a Public Task .................................................................................................. 4 2.1 Duties and responsibilities ................................................................................................ 4 2.2 Changes in the security architecture .................................................................................. 5 3. Is Security Technology the Solution? ................................................................................. 5 3.1 Examples of security technology implementation in cities .................................................. 6 3.1.1 Video surveillance ............................................................................................... 6 3.1.2 Biometric access systems ..................................................................................... 7 3.1.3 RFID ................................................................................................................... 8 3.2 Technical-organizational convergence of security technologies ......................................... 10 4. Urban Life under Changing Security Conditions ................................................................ 10 5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 13 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 14 Abstract The terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London have made central, local authorities and the public acutely aware that urban agglomerations, with their high-rise office blocks, concentrated mixed-use and resi- dential areas and major technological infrastructures, are particularly vulnerable to this type of threat. Al- though this is not the first time towns and cities have had to face such dangers, the number of terrorist attacks has increased significantly since the 1990s. Real and suspected threats are not confined to catastrophic inci- dents affecting world metropolises and megalopolises; they also include every-day crime. Security systems us- ing information and communication technology (e.g. video surveillance, biometrics and radio frequency identification) have the potential to avert these dangers, minimize their impact or, at the very least, reinforce crime fighting efforts. However, many are concerned about the Orwellian nature of such technologies and the social exclusion they may cause. Despite a current lack of integrated urban security policies with dedi- cated security resources, new urban security regimes are developing to meet specific threats. Urban policy- makers and councils must assess the potential benefits and risks of ICT-supported security technology impar- tially and on the basis of hard facts. This Difu paper1 will contribute to the debate by defining urban security as a public responsibility, describing promising ICT-supported security technologies and technological- organizational convergence in an urban setting, and by sketching the future of city life under new security re- gimes. Keywords: Security, Urban Policy, Video Surveillance, Biometrics, RFID 1. Changing Conditions – Time for New Approaches? 1.1 New threats? Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London, the public is more aware than ever that towns and cities, with their densely built-up areas and sophisticated infrastructures, are extremely vulnerable. A quick glance around the world to Latin America, Asia or the Middle East shows that the terrorist threat to towns and cities is by no means a recent devel- opment. Urban Europe has itself long been subject to attacks from groups such as ETA2 and the IRA3. Since the 1990s, however, terrorist attacks on urban areas have been on the increase (Savitch 2005) and will continue to be an issue in the future. Yet, 1 The paper is based largely on Floeting 2006. 2 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. 3 Irish Republican Army. 3 whether real or suspected, threats to the urban fibre are not confined to mass attacks aimed at „global cit- ies“ and megalopolises; the worries commence with everyday crime. Urban security is the subject of increasing public de- bate, which often leads to the assumption that towns and cities are unsafe per se. A number of myths must be dispelled. For example, „the fear of crime is influenced less by the 'objective' crime rate than by problematic social situations in residential areas.“ (Oberwittler 2003, p. 31). Never- theless, around 40% of Germans fear a sharp rise in crime rates and are concerned by increased vandal- ism (around 30%), graffiti (20% of West Germans and 29% of East Germans) and begging (18% of west Germans and 21% of east Germans) (Opaschowski 2005, cited in Stegemann 2005). No one disputes the fact that in some urban areas security, once taken for granted „as a by-product“ (e.g. platform staff at train stations, bus and train conductors etc.), has fallen victim to staff cuts and must now be painstak- ingly „repurchased“. Thus, the increase in private se- curity services4 cannot be attributed exclusively to declining safety levels in urban areas. „To at least some extent, this figure is due to a statistical manipu- lation related to increased outsourcing“ (Sie- bel/Wehrheim 2003, p. 24) and to „security as a by- product“ having been curtailed. Even the use of se- curity technologies cannot automatically be inter- preted as a reaction to growing urban insecurity. „Nor can any conclusions about surveillance in cit- ies be drawn from [increased] sales of CCTV5 sys- tems. […] Cameras are often simply used to regulate traffic flow“ (ibid.). In a fictional speech on the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Richard A. Clarke – until 2003 the U.S. National Coordinator for Security, Infra- structure Protection and Counter-terrorism – de- picted a terrorist threat to cities that would demand security measures extending far beyond anything we have experienced thus far. Not only the critical infra- structure was at risk, he explained, but also casinos, theme parks, hotels, shopping malls, etc. (Clarke 2005). If there is no such thing as total security, then just how much protection can be guaranteed, how much must we and can we afford and how great a risk are we willing to take? 4 Since the 1990s the number of people working for pri- vate security providers in Germany has risen by 50% to around 145,000 (v. Landenberg 2004). 5 Closed circuit television. 1.2 New approaches to improved safety? Until now, academic debate has rarely explored the interplay of domestic security and urban develop- ment. The sparse discussions of the issue have fo- cused on the historical perspective6. Experts, the public and the media assess threats to security very differently. Even expertises are inconsistent7. Tailor- ing precautionary measures requires precise, objec- tive risk assessments. Security plans – not just for terrorist threats – primar- ily focus on so-called critical infrastructures. These include „organizations and facilities of key impor- tance to the urban community whose destruction or impairment would result in long-term supply bottle- necks, considerable disturbances to public safety or other dramatic consequences“ (DStGB 2006, p. 6). In Germany they are categorized as follows: energy supply; drinking water supply; food; health services; telecommunication and information technology; passenger and freight systems; handling of hazardous materials; finance and insurance; administrative bod- ies and public authorities; other fields, such as pro- tection of cultural heritage, landmark buildings, ma- jor research facilities, media etc. Since these infra- structures are mutually dependent, damage to any one of them would significantly affect every aspect of urban life – power cuts amply illustrate this inter- connection. Restructuring in recent years, including continuing internationalization of networks (e.g. en- ergy and telecommunications), privatization and par- tition of state infrastructure (e.g. passenger and freight systems) and increasing dependence on in- formation technology, has necessitated inclusion of new players and a general overhaul of existing secu- rity plans. Locally, security policy is seen „as a matter for higher government authorities and international de- fence alliances“ (Lenk 2006, p. 1). Although risks and threats clearly affect people at a local level and, 6 Traditionally, „organized [...] politically motivated vio- lence targeting urban areas, their populations and supply systems has been persistently neglected in critical aca- demic debates about cities and urbanization“ (Graham 2004: p. 58). „Since the Second World War“ contempo- rary urban research has had a tendency „to avoid broa- ching the subject, because the notion of destroyed cities directly conflicts with optimistic images of progress, or- der and modernization“ (ibid., p. 59). 7 „Dangers which the public find most frightening and shocking are not necessarily those which (statistically speaking) cause the most deaths. […] In many instan- ces, public alarm over dangers does not reflect scienti- fic risk assessment. […] Often, it is impossible to find any definitive scientific assessment of a given risk“ (Schütz/Peters 2002, p. 40). 4 more importantly, are felt locally („crime hotspots“, „critical infrastructure“, „no-go areas“ are just three terms which highlight the local relevance of security issues), we still do not have a comprehensive local security policy. Currently, responsibility for local risk management „as a whole does not fall under overall municipal policy“ and „is relegated to the various departments: emergency medicine, fire fighting, po- lice“ (ibid.). Even cautious analysts would say that local risk control, measured against the local fallout of global risks and threats, does not yet seem „par- ticularly mobilized“ (ibid.). Dealing with threats demands realistic assessment, prevention – insofar as this is possible – and con- certed action when damage occurs. Increasingly, this can only be achieved by cooperation among the de- partments. The wider the damage, the more apparent this need becomes. Even minor disasters require a considerable amount of coordination, and a collabo- rative approach to prevention makes sense. Security technologies can increasingly be applied to every phase of danger and damage control. Although their potential is rated highly, their actual use is „widely unplanned, due to vague conjecture about the usefulness of particular technologies“ (ibid.). So far, little has been said about the relationship be- tween employing security technologies, assuring domestic security and urban planning. At the same time, it would appear that more diffuse threats in- crease willingness to resort to technological solu- tions. In his fictional speech, Clarke says that „smart“ video surveillance cameras are to be installed „throughout public areas“, that all video monitoring will be linked „to a central emergency management site where police officers and sophisticated software programs could track suspicious activity on main traffic arteries“ and that „security identity cards“ would be needed to use local public transport (Clarke 2005). 2. Security as a Public Task 2.1 Duties and responsibilities A key task of government is „protecting the public from dangers which cannot be averted individually“ (Weber 2004, p. 1) and „guaranteeing security and public order“ (DST 2004, p. 1). In Germany, the po- lice are the principle guardians of law and order. They are supported by other enforcement agencies. Civil defence in Germany is structured hierarchi- cally; the federal government and Länder work to- gether. Civil defence is a national responsibility, while the states handle disaster control. Germany's civil defence relies largely on a safety and rescue system provided by honorary and voluntary organi- zations (volunteer fire brigades, the Deutsche Le- bens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft e.V., German Red Cross, the Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund, etc.). In particular, local governments in Germany are entrusted with ensuring law and order. „When city walls became redundant, external security [...] ceased to be a municipal re- sponsibility, and since the Munich police force, the last to be re-established after the Second World War, was nationalized in 1975 (Lange 1998, p. 83), inter- nal security has also been a federal and Land obliga- tion“ (v. Kodolitsch 2003, p. 5). Municipal security focuses are: risk prevention (granting and withdrawing pub/ restaurant/amusement arcade licences etc., estab- lishing prohibited zones, monitoring immigrant organizations etc., sheltering the homeless, im- posing curfews, protecting minors and restricting the right of assembly), urban development measures (establishing use criteria, preventing emergence of architectural no-go areas etc.) and designing social, youth, family, housing, educa- tion, culture, employment and other policies to support crime prevention. Security and preventative measures as tasks in them- selves are only slowly entering discussions in these areas8. It was not until the early 1990s that municipalities recognized security as an interdepartmental respon- sibility and developed integrated approaches, gener- ally grouped under the heading „local crime preven- tion“ (cf. DST 2004, p. 2 ff.). New local security tools (ibid.) include: public order and security partnerships between police and the municipality: they aim to curb the tendency to „place responsibility for security ex- clusively with the police and public order with the city“ (DST 2004, p. 2), crime prevention councils to integrate citizen in- volvement and contribute to developing neighbourhood solutions, municipal security services to assume security duties which, due to cutbacks in state budgets, can no longer be performed by the police or which are no longer provided by local depart- 8 „The impact [of these areas] on security and crime pre- vention was, with the exception of a few departments, not the explicit aim of local government practice, and was often not even recognized as a side effect of the actual function performed.“ (v. Kodolitsch 2003, p. 6) 5 ments (e.g. Inspection duties traditionally carried out by parking attendants, conductors etc.). Urban areas are increasingly depicted as crime zo- nes and debates are often fuelled by a growing fear of crime rather than being founded on actual crime rates. The security situation in Germany's conurba- tions is, however, „far less critical than in most other cities in Europe and the world“ (DST 2004, p. 1). Yet within metropolitan regions, there are „clear signs that our security systems must be refined and ex- tended“ (ibid.) to meet emerging demands. Concerns include: organized crime and corruption, new security issues in areas with negative demo- graphic trends, growing citizen expectations in the sphere of public order and general risk protection (ibid.). Additionally, debates on urban security are focusing more on terrorist threats. Metropolitan regions are at their most vulnerable when staging major events or developing existing infrastructures. 2.2 Changes in the security architecture German federal security policy has been restructred considerably since 2001. The line between internal and external security has become blurred; risks and threats can no longer be unequivocally categorized as one or the other. Players active in the two fields rely increasingly on cooperation to solve new secu- rity problems9. The German federal government and the Länder have formulated a joint New Strategy for Civil Protection in exceedingly threatening situations which emphasizes collaboration within the security community. It harmonizes the existing resources of the federal government, Länder, municipalities and relief organizations, and develops new coordination instruments. The perceived deterioration of the security situation has made citizens more willing to accept restrictions to their personal freedom. For instance, 90% of Brit- 9 „Throughout the Cold War internal and external securi- ty were separated politically, and, most importantly, by constitutional law following prevailing international se- curity paradigms; today, the far-reaching consequences of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have led to a confluence of the demands on both branches of government security policy. […] Current threat and vulnerability analyses and the short, mid and long-term measures which result from them must be pursued in a concerted effort by threat prevention organs, i.e. intelli- gence services, police authorities, state civil defence and armed forces.“ (Weber 2004: p. 2) ish citizens endorse video surveillance of public places, 44% of Germans feel antiterrorist security precautions are insufficient, and more than 60% would like to see the German armed forces deployed for law enforcement and border protection duties (Allensbach survey, cf. BPB 2004, p. 2). In German cities internal security measures influence different spheres and constitute new security regimes. Meas- ures include legislation (amending security and pub- lic order acts, threat protection regulations), organ- izational intervention (replacing informal arrange- ments with government agencies or private enter- prise) and symbolic alterations to the cityscape (clos- ing off certain areas, enhancing visibility, beautifica- tion) (Wehrheim 2004). Technology upgrades are es- sential to inner security in cities. 3. Is Security Technology the Solution? Security technology can facilitate risk avoidance and security measures in every phase: analysis of dangerous and threatening situations, prevention support, security situation assessment, coordination of disaster management and re- sponse activities and disaster area rehabilitation. The security technology sector offers an array of so- lutions equal to the complex task which are being implemented in municipalities or may be introduced in the future. Commonly praised advantages of secu- rity technology include (cf. DStGB 2003, p. 17): programmability and configurability, which en- sure reliable operation, efficiency, thanks to availability, durability, tech- nical efficiency and precision, innovativeness, high cost-benefit ratio, in particular when incor- porating the potential damage averted, lower in- surance costs, etc. The advantages are weighed against misgivings re- garding ubiquitous technological surveillance and social exclusion and scepticism towards security promises. Nonetheless, security authorities are will- ing to resort to technology, particularly when faced with imminent or suspected threats. In most cases this occurs before thorough analysis has been per- formed or integrated action plans synergizing tech- nology, strategies, concepts and non-technological measures have been devised. Such solutions appear to appease technology users, or at least decision- 6 makers, who are at least able to demonstrate the ability to react in critical situations, and technology providers who „portray an immature technological application as a panacea“ (Lenk 2006, p. 2). The security market is booming. In the United States the Department of Homeland Security alone has a budget of roughly $40 billion. The German federal government, Länder and municipalities spend ap- proximately 30 billion euros annually on internal se- curity (v. Landenberg 2004). Since the 9/11 attacks „the market for access control and video surveillance systems has tripled“ (ibid., p. 44). In Germany, pri- vate security service sales have risen from 1.9 billion euros in the early 1990s to 3.6 billion euros (v. Lan- denberg 2004). These figures clearly show that the employment of security technologies and urban se- curity restructuring not only involve security consid- erations, but are also economically motivated. 3.1 Examples of security technology implementation in cities This section expounds upon only a few examples of new security technology application in municipali- ties. The cases described below focus on „visible“ front-end applications. They illustrate how common- place security technologies already are in spheres which do not incontestably fall under „internal secu- rity“. Apart from concrete examples, some common areas of application can be identified: information systems (for players and residents), expert systems (decision support), workflow management systems (to facilitate co- operation between a disparate cast of players), help systems (for players and citizens), monitoring networks (information gathering and early warning), GIS applications (spatial analysis and forecasting potential and imminent disasters), data mining (to generate detailed profiles), augmented reality (to aid decision-makers and their support staff) and ubiquitous computing (comprehensive network- ing). 3.1.1 Video surveillance The topic of video surveillance is not new to mu- nicipalities. It is considered „the most significant in- novation for internal security in cities“ (Wehrheim 2004, p. 23) in recent years. Video cameras are wi- dely used to monitor traffic. Video surveillance sys- tems have also become an established component of facility security (for government agencies, stadiums, public transport etc.). For years now video surveil- lance systems have been used to prevent crime on city streets and in public spaces, e.g. to police drug- related criminality. This development was spear- headed by British municipalities, some of which have proceeded to implement CCTV systems exten- sively in shopping streets, busy public places and elsewhere so individuals can be traced throughout larger areas of cities. Surveillance of this sort can be automated with the support of biometric and behavioural characteristics. One possible use would be „filtering out“ people who are considered likely to do property damage (e.g. graffiti tagging) on the basis of route tracking. Alongside permanent surveillance systems, mobile video surveillance has become more widespread. In Britain „many municipalities […] have introduced CCTV vans equipped with digital cameras and con- trol rooms“ (Hempel 2003). German Länder plan to deploy more mobile surveillance units (e.g. Baden- Württemberg and Bavaria). Video surveillance was first allowed in Germany af- ter 2000 as a result of Länder police law amend- ments. There has been no attempt to establish a na- tionwide surveillance scheme like the one in the UK. Cities argue that video surveillance activities should be restricted to crime hotspots. Surveillance can complement other crime prevention measures, but is not a substitute for them (DST 2004, p. 5). The num- ber of permanently installed video cameras is esti- mated at 500,000. Video surveillance has only been used sporadically to monitor crime in German cities. For the most part crime-ridden areas were observed with two to three cameras (Wehrheim 2004, p. 23). The London terror attacks, the train bombs found in North Rhine-Westphalia and daily reports of vandal- ism and violence on public transport and in public spaces in general have spurred further debate on substantially broadening the scale of video surveil- lance. Because constant surveillance of public places often leads to profound invasions of personal privacy (the right to one's own image, the right to informational self-determination) its implementation is limited; pri- vate monitoring of public spaces is restricted, time limits have been set for data storage, the use of hid- den cameras is prohibited and notices of surveillance activities must be posted. Nonetheless, there con- tinue to be grey areas, infringements and inconsis- tencies which have incited public debate on video 7 surveillance10. The use of surveillance data in bor- derline cases continues to be a hot topic11. Video surveillance data analysis has proven particu- larly effective in solving crimes. It is used more and more to identify offenders (e.g. following the attacks in the London Underground, in combatting ordinary crimes, vandalism etc.). A wide range of opinions have been expressed regarding how effectively video surveillance deters crime. Its preventive impact in high crime areas is commonly mentioned as a posi- tive outcome along with its provision of evidence for criminal prosecution. Measurable crime reduction in areas monitored with CCTV is sometimes offset by increased crime rates in other areas, the so-called displacement effect. The scale of surveillance has expanded significantly in recent years and will continue to grow in the mid- term. In addition to the proliferation of cameras in public spaces, various surveillance techniques are being networked, and private und public security measures are being coordinated, e.g. to create secu- rity alliances (cf. Hempel 2003). 3.1.2 Biometric access systems Using biometric identification in counterterrorism has been discussed frequently in recent years. The debate centres on integrating biometric data in iden- tification documents and using biometric traits for identification and access control. The number of op- erational biometric ID systems in Europe has sky- rocketed from around 8,500 (1996) to over 150,000 (2004) (European Commission Joint Research Center – JRC, cf. Horvath 2005). The biometrics industry is expected to grow considerably. Unfortunately, no of- ficial revenue or employment statistics are kept for this sector. It is difficult to distinguish exactly what proportion of security technology implements bio- metrics, and the companies involved tend to have prohibitive information policies (cf. Petermann/ Sauter 2002, p. 6). We must therefore rely on market 10 Some instances involving municipalities include the video surveillance of a men's changing room at a pub- lic swimming pool in Freiburg („Videoüberwachung überraschend gestoppt“ [Video Surveillance Unexpect- edly Halted]), Badische Zeitung, 8 November 2003) and the video monitoring of waste collection areas as part of the campaign „Unser sauberes Braunschweig“ (Keeping Our Braunschweig Tidy), Braunschweig im Putzwahn (Braunschweig in a Cleaning Frenzy), taz Nord, 15 March 2004. 11 One example is the German Border Patrol/German Federal Police's use of the Deutsche Bahn AG's video surveillance system in and around train stations (Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragter [Federal Commissioner for Data Protection] 2005, p. 63). studies conducted by interest groups and private in- stitutions. These studies indicate that sales in the biometrics sector will soar from $600 million (2002) to $4 billion (2007). Biometric technologies are con- sidered „the most important IT innovations in the near future“ (BITE 2005). In 2004 the entire biomet- rics market in Germany was estimated at 12 million euros. Large federal government contracts are ex- pected to push market volume to 377 million euros by 2009 (SOREON 2004, cf. http://www.heise.de/ newsticker/meldung/48560). Despite the stated res- ervations, the figures suggest that the market is in- deed still maturing. As is often the case when new technologies are first introduced, revenue forecasts are very optimistic. It is also evident that large gov- ernment contracts have been driving the market. Biometric systems tested to date use facial recogni- tion, fingerprinting and iris scans: Facial recognition systems analyze specific facial features from a scanned image. The individual traits analyzed are used to create a biometric sig- nature. Two and three-dimensional facial recog- nition systems are available. Finger printing systems generate individual fin- gerprint images. Various types of sensors are em- ployed (pressure, ultrasonic, optical, thermal, electric and capacitive12). The image is used to detect characteristic peculiarities (arches, loops and whorls) which are compared with existing data. Iris recognition systems illuminate the eyes of the person being identified with infrared light to cre- ate a high-resolution, near-infrared image which is then examined for specific features (corona, depressions, muscle fibres, pigment spots, scars, radial furrows, striations). Idiosyncratic traits are then used to generate an iris code which is com- pared to records in a database. Forensics identify people using DNA characteris- tics13. An array of unsolved problems remains. Some indi- viduals cannot be detected with fingerprint and iris recognition because their traits cannot be recognized or are not sufficiently distinctive. With age, recogni- 12 Capacitive sensors use conductor plates (capacitor) which measure the flow of DC currents between the surface of the capacitor and the finger (dielectric) to generate greyscale images. This can sometimes be used to chart the characteristics of living skin underneath the external layer, reducing the distorting effects of injuries and similar inconsistencies on biometric measurements (cf. Petermann/Sauter 2002, p. 25). 13 Deoxyribonucleic acid is a nucleic acid stored in cell nuclei which forms a double helix and contains the ge- netic instructions for biological development. 8 tion methods become less reliable and some occupa- tions (e.g. jobs in which finger injuries are common) hamper biometric recognition. Moreover, conditions at the time of recognition (e.g. lighting during facial scanning) can interfere with the system. Lastly, these systems are feared to have too many security loop- holes, e.g. fingerprint recognition (Bundesdaten- schutzbeauftragter 2005, p. 47 f.). In addition, no bioethical frame of reference has been established for the development and use of biometric technolo- gies. Discussions on the acceptability of biometric technologies have focused mainly on cost-benefit aspects and security issues (BITE 2005). The notion that such access systems are only em- ployed in high security areas and at border control points is erroneous, as the entry system for Hanover Zoo season ticket holders illustrates. People wishing to subscribe to the zoo must first supply personal in- formation which is recorded in a ticketing system. A digital photo is taken and saved the first time the ticket holder visits the zoo. Digital photographs are taken before entry on every subsequent visit and are compared with the stored data. Visitors may only en- ter after they have been positively identified. When requesting family tickets, purchasers must provide proof of familial relation (child benefit book, official family records, official ID, health insurance card). With more than 71,000 season ticket holders, this represents the largest application of biometric identi- fication in Germany's service sector (DStGB 2003, Glitza 2004, Schiffhauer 2004). The first attempt to use biometric characteristics, in this case finger- prints, had failed because the system was thought unsanitary and had a poor child identification rate. In addition, the system was not waterproof (cf. Glitza 2004, Schiffhauer 2004). Municipalities could install biometric entry systems in places like museums and sports venues. Numerous other applications in the realm of security are conceivable. 3.1.3 RFID Radio frequency identification (RFID) is microchip technology which enables contact-free data transfer. RFID systems include an antenna, a transceiver, a transponder and radio frequency technology. They can be employed to: recognize objects, authenticate documents and commercial goods optimize processes, i.e. automate logistics, support access control and track vehicles and monitor the environment etc. Transponder systems are not entirely new. They have been used to identify animals for around 20 years; transponders are either injected or implanted as ear tags. Initially, these systems were only used exten- sively for livestock, they are now used for pets as well. Due to significant advances in silicon chip technology and radio transmission, and especially due to the improved integration of the two, RFID has become a focus of public debate. It is superior to other technologies employed for similar purposes: It offers a much broader range of features for ac- cess control technology than standard smart card and magnetic stripe systems. Non-contact data transmission is user-friendlier (no waiting peri- ods, active registration process etc.). In the logistics field, bulk processing can replace the time and labour consuming individual regis- tration of goods. This improves operational effi- ciency and increases resource utilization rates. RFID also has security advantages (e.g. asset tracking). Branches with high security requirements and ex- tensive verification procedures benefit most from cost reduction (e.g. logistics and waste manage- ment companies). Businesses with self-contained supply chains (e.g. retailers) also expect to profit from this tech- nology. In flow structures of this sort RFID trans- ponders, which are still relatively costly, can be used repeatedly and continually. Retail giants Metro, Wal-Mart and Tesco were among the first to adopt RFID technology. The Metro Group's Future Store initiative in Rheinberg in North Rhine-Westphalia tests new technologies for use in retail sales. One plan is to replace individual barcode scanning at checkout with electronic bulk scanning while the goods are still in the shopping cart. The scanned data is stored in a mainframe computer. Individual links in the value-added chain (manufacturers, distributors, purchasing departments, warehouses) are net- worked with the central computer and have ac- cess to the database. Customer cards incorporat- ing RFID transponders may be integrated into the system. The ultimate goal is to replace barcodes with RFID transponders (BSI 2004, p. 85 f.). Cities are applying RFID technology to an ever greater degree. RFID applications already abound in public transport. Because about a fifth of ticket costs are spent to manage ticket sales, radio frequency identification is appealing to transit companies. Adopting this technology is expected to lower costs and improve transport operations. Germany's first smart-card project on public transport was launched 9 in Cologne in the early 1990s; the first project with contact-free cards was introduced in the mid-1990s (Cap 2005). RFID applications are used in healthcare to clearly attribute medical information to patients. For in- stance, a Saarbrücken medical centre provides pa- tients with RFID bracelets. RFID transponders will soon track blood supplies. Transponders are attached to blood bags when they arrive at the hospital and are programmed with a number which is linked to a database containing detailed information on the ori- gin of blood donations and instructions regarding their intended use. PDAs14 and readers enable hos- pital staff to retrieve the data from the RFID trans- ponder and compare it to the data in the patient's wristband. The data is simultaneously incorporated in the centre's process work flow system and the pa- tient's file15. Facility managers can use RFID to register supplies and maintain inventory. For example, the Berliner Wasserbetriebe are implementing RFID technology to supervise their facilities. The Wasserbetriebe's ap- proximately 60,000 assets at 250 locations in Berlin and Brandenburg are being equipped with RFID transponders. Information can be downloaded to mobile data readers and is automatically recorded in the inventory system16. RFID can also facilitate municipal utilities. Waste management companies in the districts Hof, Erlan- gen-Höchstadt, Mühldorf am Inn, Kehlheim am Inn and Heiligenstadt mark their refuse containers with RFID transponders, each with an individual identifi- cation code. The arrangement provides information on waste pickup sites and container size. Waste dis- posal vehicles are equipped with readers. Rubbish collection is automatically recorded on a smart card in a computer installed in the vehicle. Following pi- ckup, the data can be itemized and used in invoic- ing. Weighing systems on the vehicles assist in cal- culating the exact amount of rubbish collected and determining individual waste disposal fees (BSI 2004, p. 70). RFID systems in Munich Public Libraries allow visi- tors to self-issue books and media. By 2009 Munich Public Libraries' freely accessible collection consist- 14 Personal digital assistant, small, hand-held computer. 15 „Erster Deutscher Kongress für Patientensicherheit, Bundesweites Medienecho“ (Nationwide Media Cove- rage of the First German Patient Safety Convention), http://www.klinikum-saarbruecken.de/kliniknews/ index.php3?tid=256&a=NEWS, 13 November 2006. 16 „Berliner Wasserbetriebe now using RFID to help man- age facilities“, http://www.esg.de/en/press/pressre- leases/?tid=755, 13 November 2006. ing of 3.15 million holdings will be equipped with RFID tags. Users can borrow library materials at self- service stations. Automated book depositories in the lobby and outside make it possible to return bor- rowed items when the libraries are closed. Data stored on RFID transponders is transmitted to the main system and library accounts are automatically updated. Sorting equipment built into the book re- turn machines and a desktop interface which recog- nizes RFID technology assist in issuing and sorting items. Security gates at the exits equipped with de- tectors warn when materials which have not been is- sued are being taken from the library17. A major worry regarding RFID technology is that personal data may be manipulated because the processing stages lack transparency. Some systems allow data access from metres away. Both RFID and readers can be inconspicuously embedded in every- day objects. Data protection concerns are reinforced by awareness that „identifying individuals, including linking this technology with video cameras, […] has already been tested on the market“ (Bundesdaten- schutzbeauftragter 2005, p. 46). A number of every- day viability issues remain18. RFID chips continue to make inroads. On April Fools' Day in 2004 the computer magazine c’t could still joke that RFID chips were being embedded in number plates – a year later Britain did just that. To encumber forgery of officially issued plates, authori- ties began tagging them with RFID chips. Tagging al- so made it possible to record movement patterns, a bonus – or drawback – depending on the perspec- tive19. Another example of extensive use of RFID technologies is New Songdo, a city in South Korea 40 miles southwest of Seoul. This real-estate devel- opment scheme is conceived as a free trade area which will accommodate 65,000 inhabitants and 300,000 workers; English will be the lingua franca and various international currencies will be ac- cepted20. The developers plan to network the prin- 17 „Bücher aus dem Automat“ (Books from a Machine), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 January 2006. 18 At the Confederations Cup in Germany in 2005 many fans had pinned their tickets to pin boards, destroying the RFID chips in their tickets and complicating the admission process. A warning not to bend tickets was printed on the tickets, but no one planned on fans post- ing their tickets on pin boards (cf. WM-Tickets bitte nicht knicken (Please Do Not Bend Your World Cup Tickets), http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/ 61251, 31 August 2005). 19 „Briten testen funkende Autokennzeichen“ (The British Test Electronic Number Plates), Spiegel Online, 11 Au- gust 2005, http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/technolo- gie/0,1518,369248,00.html, 26 August 2005. 20 The developers provide a detailed description at http://www.new-songdocity.co.kr/, 7 November 2005. 10 cipal information systems, allowing seamless data exchange. Data protection issues are practically ig- nored; backers appear to have no misgivings what- soever about the prospect of creating an „Orwellian state“. The project is predominantly viewed as an opportunity to demonstrate technological prowess and to attract foreign investors (O’Connell 2005)21. 3.2 Technical-organizational convergence of security technologies New security technologies can be utilized in a vari- ety of ways in urban areas. The combination of a range of technologies, such as video surveillance, biometric profiling and non-contact data transfer is enabling the development of complex identification, entry and surveillance systems. These can control access to and use of certain areas (city centres, local public transport, embassies, ministries, government agencies etc.) and larger parts of a city. Convergent technology systems like these are already in place. Economic changes (e.g. the fall in the price of com- puter memory) and technological developments (e.g. higher capacity storage media) are making it easier to manage data. Storing information without specific justification or purpose is becoming an increasingly popular precautionary measure (particularly in secu- rity circles). It is also maintained that the public is more inclined to allow their personal data to be fi- led, possibly as a trade-off for heightened security. On the basis of this assumption, there have been ef- forts from some quarters to facilitate the process of gaining ex post access to data which was originally gathered for different purposes. The debate on using road toll data to combat crime and terrorism demon- strates the issues at hand. The gradual spread of the practice of using data retroactively for objectives other than those originally intended is one of the main reasons for public opposition to storing per- sonal data in any form. On the one hand, we must take full advantage of all technologies which can be employed to contain threats. On the other hand, the growing practice of collecting personal data and information that can be traced back to individuals within their particular ur- ban setting and the possibility to link this data will 21 Examples of possible applications are: „public recy- cling bins that use radio frequency identification tech- nology to credit recyclers every time they toss in a bot- tle; pressure-sensitive floors in the homes of older peo- ple that can detect the impact of a fall and immediately contact help; cell phones that store health records and can be used to pay for prescriptions“ (O’Connell 2005). take surveillance to a whole new level. Organiza- tional as well as technical convergence has a par- ticular role to play in this domain. The opportunity to link data, combined with factors such as the in- creased overlapping of internal and external security countermeasures and a desire to assess the situation comprehensively based on the available facts, will make it possible to develop ever more detailed pro- files of individuals. Without wanting to dramatize the situation by conjuring an image of the „transparent citizen“, technical-organizational convergence will make it easier than ever to obtain details on private citizens. Closer integration of technical and organ- izational resources will also increase the danger of data being misappropriated at a later date. 4. Urban Life under Changing Security Conditions The use of information and communication security technologies involves dangers and potential benefits which must be considered and weighed up. Surveil- lance technology, for example, has preventative po- tential as it lowers the detection threshold (e.g. of minor violations and crimes) and of potentially dan- gerous situations. The subsequent growth in intelli- gence on particular security matters could theoreti- cally enable early intervention. Empirical findings however, taking the situation as a whole into ac- count, demonstrate that the potential of these tech- nologies is not being exploited and cannot be ex- ploited22. On the other hand, there is a danger that surveillance which is focused too heavily on certain areas will lead to exclusion or crime displacement. The implementation of ICT security technologies can improve a city's accessibility if, for example, perma- nent security measures such as fences, security mar- gins and protection devices are replaced by techno- logical control systems and temporary measures. However, these technologies can also reduce the ac- cessibility of certain city areas if that is the purpose of the system or if its implementation targets certain social groups too heavily (cf. Graham 2005). It is always difficult to assess the impact of a tech- nology. Security technology, too, can only be prop- erly judged once in a specific application. The grow- 22 „In 2002, the British Home Office published its findings from an evaluation of 22 rigorous surveys on the im- pact of video surveillance in the U.S and the U.K. […] According to the report, the number of cars stolen and broken into fell by 40 percent, pickpocketing, however, went down by only two to four percent and there was barely any change in the level of violent crime.“ (Wehrheim 2004, p. 24) 11 ing use of security technologies must be considered in the context of real and perceived threats and the security regime which has been set up to counter them23. The changing nature of the threat, the increasing use of security technology in particular parts of the city and the growing significance of security issues for ci- ty life could have a variety of repercussions. These include a fundamental shift in the image of cities, the long-term transformation of urban architecture and space and adjustments in the use of urban sites. The public may increasingly view cities as unsafe places, giving rise to a new type of „urban fear“. Cit- ies are comparatively „unmanageable areas“ and are therefore suspected of harbouring every type of secu- rity threat: from „common criminals“ to terrorists planning attacks. These fears are already being voi- ced in international urban studies literature24. Are we reverting back to fortified cities and easily con- trollable Hausmannian boulevards? Will the elec- tronic portal become the new barricade in the infor- mation and communication technology age? (cf. Vi- rilio 2004) A growing or lasting threat could lead to cities be- coming more heavily „armed“ through the step-by- step introduction of security measures, security tech- nologies and architectural features which promote safety. First, authorities and the public begin to pay more attention to what is happening around them, thus creating a kind of informal surveillance system. Then security technology is upgraded and regula- tions controlling activities in public places are tight- ened. Fences, barricades and gates are constructed and an „architecture of fortification“ begins to distort the face of the city25. In security circles, this is re- ferred to as „target hardening“ (Oc/Tiesdell 2000). Even private cars are becoming citadels. This in- 23 „The way in which surveillance is used more and more in locations which originally had nothing to do with the „Big Brother“ phenomenon, but have infrastructures which lend themselves well to the implementation of surveillance technologies, is alarming.“ (Rötzer 2004) 24 „Cities are especially well suited for furnishing terrorists with anonymity, safe houses and supply depots in order to prepare attacks as well as gain access to potential targets. […] Terrorists can more easily become invisible in overcrowded neighborhoods; they can hide weap- ons and explosives in obscure places and they can freely conduct themselves in a maze of twisting streets.“ (Savitch 2005, p. 362) 25 Oc and Tiesdell developed the concept of a step-by- step fortification of the city and defined these steps as animated presence, panoptic devices, regulatory meas- ures, fortress construction (Oc/Tiesdell 2000). cludes not only „armouring“ the body of the car26 but, in keeping with the current security trend, also equipping it with information and communication technology systems27. Supposed „archipelagos of safety“ such as shopping malls, train stations, central squares, business im- provement districts and gated communities could proliferate (cf. Wehrheim 2002)28, leading to the categorization of urban spaces according to their level of security. Polarization would result with areas viewed either as safe or unsafe. A further factor to be considered here is the existence of „undefined areas“ which are becoming increasingly common as a re- sult of demographic developments, gradual techno- logical changes and economic restructuring. Due to their frequent recycling, these areas could also be labelled as unsafe. „Ethnic profiling“ is one tool used to prevent attacks, particularly when previous attacks can be attributed to certain ethnic groups (cf. Savitch 2005). As a result, neighbourhoods predominantly populated by a particular ethnic group become a target for security services. Security consciousness could intensify the debate on the threat posed by so- called parallel societies, created by the spatial con- centration of one particular ethnic group, and mobi- lize support for methods such as restricting settling for specific groups in certain districts. Suburban ar- eas, on the other hand, are considered to be rela- tively secure29. However, if we are to take stock in 26 The hummer, tried and tested during the Golf War, is not the only car designed to withstand all. The Ford SYNUS, based on the Fiesta model, also has a tough design: („Fords Tresor-Auto. Es muss nicht immer Hummer sein“ [Ford’s mean machine. It Doesn’t Have to Be a Hummer]), Manager-Magazin, 17 January 2005). 27 The Volvo S80, for example, comes with a „Personal Car Communicator“, enabling drivers to check whether their car is secure by remote control. This function not only tells the driver if the car is locked and the alarm is activated. Using a heartbeat sensor, it can also detect if there is someone in the car: „100 Prozent Angst“ [100 Percent Fear]), Handelsblatt, 29 March 2006). 28 A literal „island of safety“ is being constructed on the 62-acre Ayers Island in Maine. The island's owners plan to transform it into an „intelligent island with sen- sors monitoring the entire area including the buildings in order to detect 'suspicious behaviour'” (Rötzer 2004). Another example of an attempt to create small pockets of security is a project in the East London dis- trict of Shoreditch. 20,000 residents are able to receive images from local CCTV cameras via their cabel con- nection enabling them to spot people behaving suspi- ciously and anonymously report their activities to the police. Residents are aided in their identification of suspicious characters by a „rogues gallery“ („ASBO-TV helps residents watch out“ The Sunday Times, 8 Janu- ary 2006). 29 „Many of the more secure places resemble the pro- tected spaces of suburban malls as well as lower- 12 Clarke's previously cited fictional speech, this haven will probably become a thing of the past (cf. Clarke 2005). „Control zones“ or „security zones“ could be con- structed on boundaries of undesirable neighbour- hoods30. Large cities could develop an island system made up of overlapping milieus (localized poverty milieus, the working, leisure and residential areas of the various lifestyle groups and the milieu of cosmo- politan, highly skilled workers) who strive to control and minimize contact with each other (cf. Wehrheim 2004, p. 26). „Security zones“ around „institutions under threat“ may be expanded to residential build- ings31. Depending on the level of security required, temporary entrance restrictions may be imposed on particular parts of a city, combined with technologi- cal surveillance of these areas. Measures temporarily restricting access are already in use. These range from police orders (declaring an area off limits to certain individuals) and constructing barricades at events to longer-term entry bans for specific areas32. Technological surveillance will considerably extend the feasibility of such entry restrictions. The growing use of technological surveillance could transform the nature of public space, ultimately re- sulting in the loss of certain spaces and the merging of public and private spheres. Some fear, for exam- ple, that public spaces could become „elite con- sumer enclaves governed by private law“ (cf. Hame- dinger 2005). Urban security regimes could have an impact on in- frastructure planning. It may be considered neces- sary, for example, to change the design of entrance areas to public transport (as has already been done to some extent in airports) and limit transfers be- tween the different carriers. The development of screening corridors equipped with explosive detec- tors or sensors which can remotely recognize hidden explosives will revolutionize existing transport infra- density, suburban housing complexes“ (Savitch 2005, p. 383). 30 For example, the draft of the new French anti-terror law provides for automated surveillance of car number plates and their occupants in „high risk“ zones. The chief of police has the powers to order the installation of cameras in a particular area if there is „founded evi- dence of suspicious activity“ without a court order (Streck 2005b). 31 For example, the security zone surrounding a diplo- mat's house in Vienna (cf. Jänicke 2004). 32 The entry ban imposed on the Madrid's Colonia Mar- coni de Villaverde to combat prostitution is a particu- larly extreme example of this type of restriction. This area can only be entered between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. with a pass. A total of 3,000 passes have been issued (Streck 2005a). structure33. In the final analysis, we have to consider the possibility that the infrastructure of major airports and train stations with adjoining shopping centres and office complexes may simply be too vast to en- sure security. For security reasons, it may make sense to decentralize facilities. This could entail the disin- tegration of shopping and transport facilities (e.g. at airports or train stations) and the introduction of size limitations or the concentration of these facilities (depending on what is more suitable for control measures). Security considerations may strongly influence town planning – at least at vulnerable locations. This would significantly change the face of city centres where such sites are concentrated (e.g. Berlin or Frankfurt am Main)34. The solution could be implementing a comprehen- sive security plan. By looking at London we can see where this development would take us. IRA attacks in the City at the beginning of the 1990s prompted construction of a „ring of steel“, like Belfast's. The number of entry points to the financial district were reduced and road blocks were erected, making it possible to temporarily cordon off the area if neces- sary. Thousands of video cameras were installed, se- curity plans were devised for financial institutions and they were advised to limit the number of en- trance points to each building. Buildings were fitted with more security technology and back-up premises 33 „To make such a measure truly effective, walkthrough detectors would need to be installed and staffed at every entrance, as is already the case in airports. Aside from the cost this would incur, it would inevitably cause severe commuting disruption. Ensuing long queues are also ideal targets for potential attackers, as has been demonstrated clearly in Iraq (Rötzer 2005). London underground is said to be planning „to test several passive millimetre wave scanners to allay pub- lic fears. These devices are able to see through passen- ger's clothes and detect concealed objects“ (ibid.). 34 The reconstruction work on Ground Zero in New York illustrates with particular clarity how security consid- erations can affect architectural design. The Freedom Tower will meet security requirements which go far beyond normal building security standards. „The square base will be constructed of impermeable con- crete and titanium steel [...] one metre thick and clad in shimmering metalwork [...] the bottom ten metres of the tower will have no windows at all“. The design re- sponds „to fears of car or lorry bombings. Police secu- rity experts insisted on the tower being constructed ac- cording to the standards required for federal buildings such as American embassies or the Pentagon. In addi- tion to this, it was stipulated that the tower be at least 30 metres away from the next public thoroughfare. There are, of course, chemical and biological filters, elaborate fire precautions, extra wide steps, a network of interconnected exits and specially protected lifts“ (Böhnel 2005). 13 of the original sites were created for an emergency. Police patrols increased significantly (cf. Coaffee 2003). Changing security conditions also have implications for the organization of mass gatherings, which have become a favourite tool of modern urban planners in their endeavours to market public space. For exam- ple, growing security demands have led to the in- creasing use of personalized tickets, which can prove extremely inconvenient for the eventgoer. Ex- tensive security measures (road blocks, flyover bans etc.) can also disable large parts of a city. The relationship between material and virtual space could change permanently. The „space of flows“ (Castells 1989) could expand significantly. Partly un- noticed, data from everyday activities could be gen- erated, selected and stored. Numerous new links be- tween the expanded „space of flows“ and material space could emerge. One example is the spread of data-based admission controls at events (with per- sonalized tickets), for border crossing (with machine- readable ID which automatically detects biometric characteristics) and for security zones (in public and private buildings). The technological developments behind this trend range from individual and isolated applications to complete sustainable networks. The catchwords in this discussion are „augmented real- ity“, „ubiquitous computing“, „pervasive computing“ and „ambient intelligence“. Ultimately, these feelings of insecurity could lead to a relocation of certain activities to cyber space, at le- ast in the short term. For example, Clarke's fictional speech describes the growing number of Internet shoppers following attacks on shopping malls (Clarke 2005). Finally, in view of their shrinking financial means, one must ask how cities will be able to respond to increase investment in security infrastructures35. There is a danger that architectural, technological and regulatory security measures in cities will suc- cessfully combat the threat of attacks, but, in doing so, will impair urban living spaces and disrupt city life, thereby achieving one of the terrorists' objec- tives. 35 Equipping the underground with passive millimetre- wave scanners would cost „up to three million euros per station“ for the machines alone (Rötzer 2005). 5. Conclusion The public debate on using technology to improve urban security has provoked a very polarized re- sponse from decision-makers as well as city resi- dents: security technology is either demonized or uncritically espoused as the solution to all the secu- rity challenges facing the city. Up until now, the po- tential benefits and risks of security technology have hardly ever been evaluated in specific contexts. In- stead of deciding whether to implement security technology on the basis of vague speculation about its virtues, we should conduct more empirical re- search into the specific effects of individual security technologies and their collective impact in their in- terfaces. Conversely, to achieve this, we must refrain from automatically condemning every move to in- troduce security technology as an attempt to estab- lish a „totalitarian State“. We should continue to ex- plore the risks associated with these technologies – assuming that this dialogue has indeed begun, a point which itself is open to debate – in order to ob- tain a more balanced assessment of the situation. Nobody disputes the fact that we are working to- wards a common goal: to make our cities safer. What must still be debated is how much security we need and how best to achieve it. The crux is not the implementation of technology itself, but how to combine it with a security plan which addresses the social origins of crime. Prevention should not be re- duced to intervening to stop „disruptive“ behaviour when it occurs, but focus on schemes which aim to nip these behavioural patterns in the bud. In the future, security looms as a vital issue for cities and their residents. Urban security regimes are de- veloping – more in response to events and ad hoc security demands than as well thought-out, integra- tive programmes. Urban impact analyses are also necessary to mould this blossoming security regime into an integrated local security policy in the me- dium term. These analyses should not only resolve urgent issues, i.e. how to manage dangerous and threatening situations and disasters, but must also as- sess the long-term impact of internal security meas- ures on urban life. These issues must be addressed by town planning and technological impact re- searchers, as well as city residents, technology users and developers. Studying the development of secu- rity technologies and urban security regimes is there- fore a central task of modern urban technology man- agement. 14 Bibliography BITE – Biometric Information Technology Ethics (2005): Press Release, January. Bone, Max (2005): Hochsicherheitsklotz statt Freiheitsturm, in: Telepolis, 6 July 2005, http://www.heise.de/bin/ tp/issue/r4/dl-artikel2.cgi?artikelnr=20459&mode=print, 26 August 2005. 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Zusammenfassung Nach den Terroranschlägen in New York, Madrid und London haben Öffentlichkeit ebenso wie Regierungs- stellen und öffentliche Verwaltungen erkannt, dass städtische Verdichtungsräume mit ihren Bürohochhäusern, verdichteten Misch- und Wohngebieten und technischen Großinfrastrukturen besonders verwundbar für der- artige Bedrohungen sind. Selbst wenn Terroranschläge für Städte keine völlig neue Bedrohung sind, so hat ih- re Zahl seit den 1990er-Jahren doch deutlich zugenommen. Tatsächliche und vermeintliche Bedrohungen gehen aber nicht nur von einzelnen Großschadensereignissen, die Weltstädte und Megametropolen betreffen, aus, sondern auch von alltäglicher Kriminalität. Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik gestützte Sicher- heitstechnik (z.B. Videoüberwachung, Biometrie, RFID) soll derartige Gefahren abwenden, deren Auswirkun- gen abschwächen oder wenigsten die Verbrechensbekämpfung unterstützen. Demgegenüber stehen Befürch- tungen von allgegenwärtiger Überwachung oder sozialer Ausgrenzung durch den Einsatz dieser Techniken. Obwohl es immer noch an einheitlicher städtischer Sicherheitspolitik mangelt, die die Anwendungsmöglich- keiten von Sicherheitstechnik gezielt einbezieht, entwickeln sich doch aus dem pragmatischen Handeln neue urbane Sicherheitsregimes. Stadtpolitik und Stadtverwaltung müssen vorurteilsfrei und gestützt auf Fakten zwischen den Potenzialen und Risiken der IuK-gestützten Sicherheitstechnik abwägen. Dieses Difu-Paper möchte zu diesem Thema einen Beitrag leisten, indem es städtische Sicherheit als öffentliche Aufgabe be- schreibt, beispielhaft IuK-gestützte Sicherheitstechniken sowie die technologischen und organisatorischen Konvergenzprozesse im urbanen Anwendungskontext beschreibt und mögliche städtische Zukünfte unter veränderten städtischen Sicherheitsregimes skizziert. Schlagwörter: Sicherheit, Stadtpolitik, Videoüberwachung, Biometrie, RFID 16 Citation/Zitierweise: Holger Floeting: Can Technology Keep Us Safe? New Security Systems, Technological-Organizational Convergence, Developing Urban Security Regimes, Berlin 2007 (Difu-Paper) Published by/Herausgeber: Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik (German Institute of Urban Affairs) Straße des 17. Juni 110 • 10623 Berlin Phone/Telefon: +49(0)30/39001-0, Fax/Telefax: +49(0)30/39001-100 E-Mail: difu@difu.de • Internet: http://www.difu.de Author/Autor: Dipl.-Geogr. Holger Floeting Editor/Redaktion: Patrick Diekelmann DTP: Christina Blödorn ISSN 1864-2853 Express permission is granted to professional publications to reproduce and reprint the “Difu Papers” if the German Institute of Urban Affairs and the author are cited as the source. Following a reprint or review, we kindly ask you to furnish a specimen copy with all particulars concerning the place and date of publication. 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